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On December 11, 2013, this Court heard oral argument on the issues presented on appeal. 
Subsequent to that argument, this Court entered on Order directing the parties to submit 
supplemental briefmg addressing issues not previously briefed. 
II. 
ISSUES TO BE ADDRESSED BY SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEFING 
A. Should the Court's holding in Nampa & Meridian Irr. Dist. v. Washington Fed. Sav., 
135 Idaho 518, 524-25, 20 P.3d 702, 708-09 (2001) ("if there is a legitimate, triable 
issue of fact, attorney fees may not be awarded under I.C. § 12-121 even though the 
losing party has asserted factual or legal claims that are frivolous, unreasonable, or 
without foundation") be overturned or amended? 
B. Should this Court look to the gravamen of the cause of the action in determining 
attorney's fees? 
C. Should I.R.C.P. 54(e)(I) be amended to be consistent with the plain meaning of 
Idaho Code § 12-121? 
III. 
ARGUMENT 
A. The principle of stare decisis should preclude overturning the well established 
precedent articulated in Nampa & Meridian Irr. Dist. v. Washington Fed. Save 
A comprehensive review ofthe legal concept of stare decisis and how it has been applied 
in Idaho can be found in the special concurrence of Justice McDevitt in State v. Card, 121 Idaho 
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425, 440-45, 825 P.2d 1081, 1096-1102 (1991). A summary of the relevant aspects of the 
concept follow. 
"Black's Law Dictionary defmes stare decisis, '[t]o abide by, or adhere to, decided 
cases.' 1 The term is shortened from the legal maxim, stare decisis, et non quieta movere, which 
means to adhere to decided cases and not to disturb matters established. This rule is sometimes 
referred to as the doctrine of precedent or authority.,,2 
In his special concurrence, Justice McDevitt went on to state: "[a]s stare decisis evolved 
in Idaho, it is clear that this rule does not mandate unyielding acquiescence to prior decisions. 
Stare decisis is not a confining phenomenon but rather a principle of law. The rule, to stand by 
decided cases, and to maintain former adjudications, contemplates more than blindly following 
some former adjudication, manifestly wrong. If it were to be applied strictly, no former decision 
would ever be overruled. Accordingly, we recognize that this rule, though one tending to 
consistency and uniformity of decision, is not inflexible. Whether it shall be followed or departed 
from is a question entirely within the discretion of the court .... Indeed, when the application of 
this principle will not result in justice, it is evident that the doctrine is not properly applicable. 
Sometimes a court must adhere to prior unsatisfactory rules to avoid the difficult and 
burdensome results occurring after a change after a long period of accommodation.,,3 
"While we must adhere to our previous decisions, stare decisis does require us to 
reexamine our prior precedents to determine whether they are still valid. This court has stated: 
1 State v. Card, 121 Idaho 425, 440, 825 P.2d 1081,1096 (1991) (citing BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1406 (6th ed. 
1991)). 
2 Id. 
3 Id., p. 443 (citations omitted). 
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This Court in the proper performance of its judicial function is required to 
examine its prior precedents. When precedent is examined in the light of modem 
reality and it is evident that the reason for the precedent no longer exists, the 
abandonment of the precedent is not a destruction of stare decisis but rather a 
fulfillment of its proper function.,,4 
With the historical backdrop in mind, the issue to be addressed by this Court is whether 
the reason for the precedent established by cases such as Nampa & Meridian frr. Dist. v. 
Washington Fed. Sav. still exist today. Because there has been no historical or moral change 
since 2001 (the year Nampa & Meridian frr. Dist. was decided) with respect to the ability and 
right of a party to litigate a legitimate, triable issue of fact, the principle of stare decisis mandates 
that this precedent be adhered to. 
First, there is no reason to overturn Nampa & Meridian frr. Dist. due to the 
circumstances of this case because that was not a basis by which fees were awarded by the 
district court nor was the issue advocated by the trial court or respondent. Rather, both the 
district court and the Plaintiff believe that attorney's fees were properly awarded under the 
current status of the law. In other words, neither the district court nor the Plaintiff have 
advocated or argued for a change in existing law. Thus, the only issue before the Court is 
whether attorney's fees were properly awarded under the current state of the law. As argued 
extensively in the Appellant's Brief, they were not. 
Second, Plaintiff cannot point to an unfair or inequitable result in this case as a result of 
the current state of the law. While Plaintiff was deprived of possession of the PT -23 during the 
41d. (citing Smith v. State, 93 Idaho 795, 801, 473 P.2d 931,943 (1970)). 
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pendency of the litigation,5 it is undisputed Plaintiff proved no damage related to either 
Defendant Maslen or AOI's actions.6 Although requested repeatedly by Plaintiff, the district 
court did not even award Plaintiff 'nominal damages.' 7 That decision was not appealed to this 
Court. 
Plaintiff s failure to recover damages stems from their own negligence or oversight, 
rather than a defect in the current state of the law. Arguably, Plaintiff would have been entitled 
to recover its attorney's fees as damage under its theory of slander of title - regardless of a 
frivolous act of AOI. Plaintiff was denied this element of damage, however, because of its own 
negligence or oversight in complying with the district court's scheduling order. On the first day 
of trial, the district court ruled on Defendants' Motion in Limine to exclude such evidence.8 It 
cannot be overstated that Plaintiff sought $133,769.27 in attorney's fees as damage for the 
slander of title claim.9 The district court found the following: 
The plaintiffs' late disclosure violated the parties' stipulation for scheduling and 
planning, which was entered pursuant to the court's setting the case for trial and 
pretrial. 
The plaintiff has not provided any good reason or good cause concerning the 
failure to timely disclose the expert witnesses .... 
So certainly -- certainly it should come as no surprise -- and I don't think it is any 
surprise -- that proof -- if the plaintiff is seeking recovery on that as an item of 
damage, that it's going to have testimony to support it. And if the plaintiffs are 
going to present testimony in the form of expert testimony, it has to be disclosed 
pursuant to the rule. 
5 Due in part to Plaintiff s refusal to post a bond. 
6 R. Vol. III, pp. 339-94. 
7 /d.; R. Vol. III, pp. 392-400; R. Vol. III, pp. 414-20. 
8 Court Trial, Day 1, pp. 1-25. 
9 R. Vol. II, pp. 164-66. 
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And so I'm finding that there is no good cause that's been demonstrated for 
failing to timely disclose the witnesses. 10 
Again, that ruling of the district was not appealed by Plaintiff. Thus, the failure of 
Plaintiff to recover damage was only as a result of its own negligence or oversight in failing to 
timely disclose relevant evidence and is not indicative of need or reason to change the current 
state of the law. 
Further, it cannot be denied that the litigation expanded due to the Amended Complaint 
filed by Plaintiffs. If this case was solely about possession of the aircraft (for which Plaintiff 
proved no damage) it would not have been necessary for Plaintiff to amend its complaint to 
include a plethora of additional claims aimed not at possession - but at alleged economic damage 
incurred. In the end, Plaintiff was unable to prove a prima facia case on the majority of those 
claims. 
Moreover, any concern over the legislative intent of I.C. § 12-121 is unwarranted. Since 
the implementation ofI.R.C.P. 54, the legislature has done nothing to change I.C. § 12-121 or to 
draft new legislation that would alter the application ofLR.C.P. 54 or the awarding ofattomey's 
fees in cases where a single act was deemed to be 'frivolous.' As such, any concerns raised 
regarding the application of this statute would be better addressed by the legislature. 
Even if this Court was to reverse the holdings of Nampa & Meridian, the application in 
the change in the law must be applied prospectively. Again, Justice McDevitt cited the following 
in his special concurrence: 
10 Court Trial, Day 1, pp. 19-20. 
APPELLANTS' SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEF - 5 
It would therefore be extremely inconvenient to the public, if precedents were not 
duly regarded and implicitly followed. It is by the notoriety and stability of such 
rules that professional men can give safe advice to those who consult them; and 
people in general can venture with confidence to buy and trust, and to deal with 
one another. If judicial decisions were to be lightly disregarded, we should disturb 
and unsettle the great landmarks of property. When a rule has been once 
deliberately adopted and declared, it ought not to be disturbed ... except for very 
cogent reasons, and upon a clear manifestation of error; and if the practice were 
otherwise, it would be leaving us in a state of perplexing uncertainty as to the 
law. ll 
No man, who is not a lawyer, would ever know how to act; and no man who is a 
lawyer, would, in many instances, know what to advise, unless courts were bound 
by authority as firmly as the Pagan deities were supposed to be bound by the 
decrees of fate. 12 
The determination of whether an overruling decision shall be applied retroactively or 
prospectively is a matter left to state courts for determination on a case-by-case basis. 13 "The 
alternative of prospective application of decisions has a sound basis in public policy and legal 
theory." 
So it is that the doctrine of prospective overruling has attached in many areas: in 
constitutional law, contracts, torts, criminal law, taxation, and in the field of 
procedure, giving the doctrine both sanction and acceptance throughout our 
jurisprudence. Prospective overruling imparts the final degree of resilience, to the 
otherwise rigid concepts of stare decisis, so necessary to prevent the system from 
becoming brittle. It enables the law under stare decisis to grow and change to 
meet an ever-changing society and yet, at once, to preserve the very society which 
gives it shape. 14 
11 State v. Card, 121 Idaho 425,440,825 P.2d 1081, 1096 (1991) (citing 1 J. Kent, COMMENTARIES *476). 
12Id. (citing W. Jones, ESSAY ON BAILMENT). 
13 Jones v. Watson, 98 Idaho 606,608,570 P.2d 285,286 (1977). 
14 Id. (citing State v. Martin, 62 Wash.2d 645,384 P.2d 833,849 (1963)). 
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As the doctrines of stare decisis and prospective overruling demonstrate, it would be 
manifestly unfair to hold Defendants to a standard that was clearly not in existence at the time of 
the alleged single frivolous act or during the pendency of the litigation. 
Because Plaintiff had not demonstrated a historical or moral shift, or that the well-settled 
standards for determining attorney's fees are manifestly unjust, this Court should not reverse the 
holding of Nampa & Meridian Irr. Dist. and its progeny. 
B. This Court should adhere to well settled principles in determining attorney's fees 
rather than looking to the gravamen of the cause of action. 
The second issue to be addressed is whether the district court should look to the 
graveman of the cause of action in determining attorney's fees. As argued above, Plaintiff has 
not presented any compelling reason to overturn the well established precedent articulated in 
Nampa & Meridian Irr. Dist. and its progeny. 
Again, it must be recognized the Plaintiff did not request the district court to apportion 
fees based on the graveman of the cause of action. In fact, the district court did not apportion fees 
based the graveman of the action. Rather, the district court determined that the single act of AOI 
in filing the lien was frivolous and sufficient to support an award of attorney's fees pursuant to 
Idaho Code § 12-121 and LR.C.P. 54Y In response to the appeal, Plaintiff did not request that 
attorney's fees be apportioned. Therefore, no compelling reason has been put forth that would 
justify altering the current state of the law with respect to attorney's fees. 
15 R. Vol. IV, pp. 604-10. 
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This Court's ruling in Nguyen v. Bui, 146 Idaho 187, 191 P.3d 1107 (2008), establishes 
that two parties may not be "lumped" together for the purpose of awarding attorney's fees. In 
fact, one party "cannot be held accountable for attorney fees that were not incurred in litigation 
against it.,,16 
Here, the district court found one single act to be frivolous, i.e. the filing of the lien. It 
was undisputed that that the lien was filed by ADI - not Defendant Maslen. It was further 
undisputed that only ADI brought a counterclaim to enforce the lien - not Defendant Maslen. 
Thus, to the extent attorney's fees are apportioned based upon frivolous conduct, attorney's fees 
may only be assessed against ADI - not Defendant Maslen. 
C. The issue of whether I.R.C.P. 54(e)(1) should be amended or revised should be 
submitted to all attorneys of the state 
The fmal issue to be addressed is whether LR.C.P. 54(e)(1) should be amended to be 
consistent with the plain meaning of Idaho Code § 12-121. First, it is not apparent that LR.C.P. 
54(e)(1) and Idaho Code § 12-121 are, in fact inconsistent. LR.C.P. 54(e)(1) states: 
In any civil action the court may award reasonable attorney fees, which at the 
discretion of the court may include paralegal fees, to the prevailing party or 
parties as defined in Rule 54(d)(1)(B), when provided for by any statute or 
contract. Provided, attorney fees under section 12-121, Idaho Code, may be 
awarded by the court only when it finds, from the facts presented to it, that the 
case was brought, pursued or defended frivolously, unreasonably or without 
foundation; but attorney fees shall not be awarded pursuant to section 12-121, 
Idaho Code, on a default judgment. 
16 Nguyen v. Bui, 146 Idaho 187, 195, 191 P.3d 1107, 1115 (2008). 
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Further, Idaho Code § 12-121 states: 
In any civil action, the judge may award reasonable attorney's fees to the 
prevailing party or parties, provided that this section shall not alter, repeal or 
amend any statute which otherwise provides for the award of attorney's fees. The 
term "party" or "parties" is defmed to include any person, partnership, 
corporation, association, private organization, the state of Idaho or political 
subdivision thereof. 
While I.R.C.P. 54(e)(1) dictates (and certainly limits) how Idaho Code § 12-121 is to be 
applied, both can be read together to create a standard that balances the interests of the litigants 
and the judicial system without creating an "inconsistency." If the intent, however, is to no 
longer limit district judges to a standard of frivolousness when determining attorney's fees but 
rather to leave it to their sole discretion, repeal (rather than amendment) of I.R.C.P. 54(e)(1) 
would clearly accomplish the goal. 
It is well settled that this Court has the ability and authority to promulgate the Rules of 
Civil Procedure. See R.E. W Const. Co. v. District Court of Third Judicial Dist., 88 Idaho 426, 
400 P.2d 390 (1965). A decision on whether to amend (or potentially repeal) I.R.C.P. 54(e)(1) 
would obviously impact nearly every attorney practicing in the state of Idaho in all areas of the 
law. Further, it would represent a radical shift the way attorney's fees have been handled in this 
country under the American Rule for decades. 17 Such a radical shift in time-tested policy should 
be contemplative and include perspectives from all members of the bar. It is easy to envision 
mUltiple drafts of proposed amendments or alterations to I.R.C.P. 54(e)(1). Clearly, the 
17 See Great Plains Equipment, Inc. v. Northwest Pipeline Corp., 132 Idaho 754, 979 P.2d 627 (1999) (citing Idaho 
Dept. of Law Enforcementv. Kluss, 125 Idaho 682,684,873 P.2d 1336, 1338 (1994». 
APPELLANTS' SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEF - 9 
deliberative input of the entire bar on such an important issue would be necessary to ensure 
continued fairness to all concerned. 
Again, to the extent I.R. c.P. 54( e)(1) is modified, the application of any change should 
be applied prospectively, for the reasons discussed above. 
IV. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, Defendants respectfully request this Court not overturn the 
holding of Nampa & Meridain Irr. Dist. v. Washington Fed Sav.; that this Court adhere to well 
settled principles of applying attorney's fees rather than look to the graveman of the cause of 
action; and seek input from the entire bar before altering, amending, or repealing 1.R.C.P. 
54(e)(1). 
Further, to the extent well settled precedent is overturned, Defendants respectfully 
request that the doctrine of prospective overruling be adhered to. 
Finally, if attorney's fees are to be apportioned based on frivolous conduct, it is 
respectfully requested that all attorney's fees be apportioned to AOI, for the reasons outlined 
above. 




Michae J. Hanby II 
Attorneys for Defendants/Appellants 
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